When was the ifp established

Major achievements: Preventing the apartheid regime from balkanising South Africa, securing the citizenship of millions of black South Africans. Securing the release of Mandela and political prisoners to begin democratic negotiations.

Establishing Ithala Bank when commercial banks would not give loans to black South Africans. Secured the continued presence of multi-national corporations in South Africa, protecting thousands of jobs.

Ambitions for the country: To achieve social justice and economic justice for all South Africans, to enhance social cohesion, to restore integrity to leadership, and to secure education, opportunities and work for all young South Africans. The first Territorial Authority for the Zulu people was established in , which defined the Zulu homeland of KwaZulu. Buthelezi, who was a former member of the ANC but a fervent Zulu nationalist, was a shrewd, proud and prickly individual with great staying power.

He used his exceptional political skills to launch a platform that formally rejected the homelands system, but also used it as a cover for building a mass movement. Several founding members of Inkatha had either been former members of ANC, or members of the new urban middle class.

The latter saw the need for a strong organisation to advance their class interests, but did not accept the idea of an independent Zulu homeland. However, the strength and support for Buthelezi? Unlike King Solomon's Inkatha, the new organisation was only open to Zulus and citizens of Kwa Zulu Natal, and articulated a progressive agenda for freedom from its inception.

It was only in the ? Soon the Inkatha Cultural Liberation Movement had between and members. Educated Blacks viewed Buthelezi with suspicion, and saw him as representing largely the elderly, the traditional, and those in the government's pay. There is no doubt that Buthelezi was a stumbling block to the realization of the government's homelands strategy.

However, in he openly broke with the ANC in exile, its policy of sanctions and the use of the armed struggle to bring down the apartheid system. It correctly saw him as more of a threat than the other homeland leaders, who were deemed mere puppets. Buthelezi thought that the armed struggle and sanctions destroyed the chance for peaceful change, yet he told Botha that violence could not be averted 'by marching to anti-communist drums'. Buthelezi argued that violence would not flow from Marxist subversion but from White and Black leaders losing control of their constituencies.

Buthelezi offered a clear alternative to the National Party approach by proposing a multi-racial federation. In , at a commission he appointed a proposal to integrate the white-controlled province of Natal and the KwaZulu homeland. This proposal put forward that the integrated province would be run by an assembly elected by proportional representation, and a multiracial executive who made decisions along power-sharing lines. A single body would also control education, the local economy and welfare services.

Lieutenant General Lothar Neetling of the security police had sued both newspapers for defamation as a result of their allegations that he had attempted to poison anti-apartheid activists. The court found that Neetling had attempted to mislead both the court and the Harms Commission, which had relied heavily on his testimony. Despite these irregularities and the hit-squad activities now linked to Neetling and the police force, the government has failed to establish another commission to investigate the hit squads.

During , reliable evidence emerged corroborating earlier documentation by human rights groups and the press of police bias and involvement in the political violence. According to the government, they were trained for "security work and VIP protection.

Perhaps the strongest connection between the state and the IFP was the publication in July of documents revealing covert police funding to the IFP.

Addressing the causes of the violence, Black Sash, a prominent South African human rights group, noted the "overwhelming circumstantial evidence of outbreaks of violence being orchestrated; of existing conflicts being used to exacerbate the violence; of police partiality. A survey by media and monitoring groups covering the Transvaal violence from July to May held the IFP responsible for sixty-six percent of the acts of aggression and the ANC for six percent.

The Human Rights Commission reported that between January and June , sixty people were killed and injured in police actions.

In response to allegations of its involvement, the police offered categorical denials and initiated only a few prosecutions and investigations. The killings have continued despite various peace initiatives, such as the historical cease-fire agreements between the ANC and IFP leadership on January 29 and February 18, and the subsequent establishment of a Joint Peace Implementation Committee.

However, peace talks between the government and the ANC scheduled for June were suspended due to a renewed outbreak of violence. On August 19, a four-person committee was established to monitor the spending of secret government cash.

The most serious attempt yet to stem the violence took the form of a peace agreement on September 14 among the ANC, the IFP and the government. The agreement, in which the parties agreed on the establishment of a Commission on Violence, includes a code of political conduct, forbids provocative statements or actions, and is intended to promote political tolerance.

As a result of allegations that the police and defense force have used black groups to promote violence, the agreement includes a ban on training or providing funds, weapons or ammunition to nonsecurity-force members to carry out actions which undermine a political party.

It calls on leaders to refrain from using inflammatory language and to prevent the carrying of weapons, including "cultural" spears. Nonetheless, killings continued under circumstances suggesting government involvement. In the week preceding the September agreement, at least black South Africans were killed in bloody fighting that erupted after gunmen ambushed IFP supporters and killed twenty-three people.

Violence erupted simultaneously in Natal and the black townships around Cape Town. On the eve of the signing of the agreement, sixteen ANC and IFP members were killed and thirty-two injured in fighting outside Johannesburg. In the two months following the agreement, at least two hundred people died. On October 12, eighteen ANC supporters were killed by unknown assailants in an attack on a crowd marching home from the funeral of ANC member Sam Ntuli, who was assassinated in early September.

In the majority of the attacks, witnesses reported seeing plainclothesmen in cars without license plates. The government's response to allegations of its involvement was, again, to issue a denial and to demand evidence to the contrary.

However, the Commission on Violence, chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone, has begun to investigate the killings. One devastating, cumulative effect of more than fifteen years of township violence is the demise of the country's black school system. Protests, vandalism of school property, and student and teacher strikes have culminated in the highest failure rate of black high-school examinations in South African history.

In April, IFP supporters attacked two schools in Alexandra township, injuring numerous pupils and teachers. Many schools have closed down in the past few years and others have become overcrowded. The result at the end of was a thirty-six percent passing rate for blacks, as opposed to ninety-seven percent for whites.

The government continues to exert control through legislative and administrative mechanisms such as the Internal Security Act and the Public Safety Act, which have been used in the past to silence political opposition, although they were amended somewhat in by repealing or limiting the power to order house arrest, banish people to remote areas, and restrict association and movement.

While no state of emergency now exists, at least seven black townships are still declared unrest areas under the Public Safety Act, giving security agents broad powers of arrest. The Internal Security Act also still provides for detention without trial for up to ten days without access to lawyers, family and the courts. The Human Rights Commission documented cases of detention without trial between January and August In an agreement between the government and the ANC in August , elaborate guidelines were adopted to effectuate the release of all political prisoners by April 30, According to the agreement, an offense is political depending on the facts and the circumstances of the particular case, taking into account the motive, nature and purpose of the offense.

Over six months after the deadline, more than nine hundred political offenders, including six in the homeland of Bophuthatswana, continue to be detained. The violence has also severely affected two of South Africa's four so-called independent homelands.

Despite official efforts to describe the violence as "local infighting," the pattern of violence shows it to be a result of the growing tensions between supporters of the homeland authorities and opposition to the homeland system itself. The homelands system has the effect of channeling black political discontent over repressive conditions in South Africa toward the homeland political structure, and homeland authorities have seldom hesitated to suppress such dissent.

From January to August , security forces in Bophuthatswana killed at least five, injured nineteen, arrested and detained without trial thirty-eight. In Ciskei, they killed two, injured fourteen, arrested twenty-one and detained without trial thirty-three. In both Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, a strong military presence has been maintained to suppress opposition.

Although the state of emergency in Bophuthatswana was lifted in March, repression by local authorities, backed by vigilante groups, continued. Violence reached a peak in the Braklaagte area of Bophuthatswana in January with the launching of a local ANC branch, as fighting erupted between opponents and supporters of the homeland regime. Over six thousand residents were forced to flee and were not permitted to return until June.

A large police camp continues to occupy the Braklaagte village. Despite its stated intention to eradicate the last vestiges of apartheid, the South African government proceeded in early November to transfer about 2. Both Bophuthatswana and Ciskei have bills of rights protecting fundamental freedoms.

Yet, the freedoms of expression and association are severely curtailed by both homelands' National Security Acts, modeled on South Africa's repressive Internal Security Act before it was amended in June. The Acts provide for indefinite detention without trial, declare meetings of more than twenty people unlawful unless authorized, and provide the police with indemnity against prosecution.

On October 31, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, the military leader of Ciskei, declared a state of emergency, only a few weeks after signing the September National Peace Accord in which he committed himself to the promotion of political tolerance. Brigadier Gqozo gained power after a military coup in , overthrowing the regime of Lennox Sebe.

The state of emergency is the most serious in an array of measures designed to stifle opposition to Gqozo's regime. Under the emergency powers, organizations may be banned or restricted, individuals may be restricted, and businesses may be closed. The commissioner of the police may restrict media presence and prohibit distribution of printed material.