How many potential views are there of an object

But he defines a non-actual possible object as an object which could have a spatial location but does not Zalta So the claim means for Zalta that some objects could have a spatial location but do not. Among the latter type of objects are those which are actually spatial but possibly not, like you and me, and those which are possibly spatial but actually not, like the golden mountain in the appropriate sense.

Hayaki critiques both Linsky-Zalta and Williamson. In this sense, some object which encodes goldenness and mountainhood, among other properties, is a possible object but the object which encodes squareness and roundness is not. For a comparison of the two-kinds-of-property approach and the two-kinds-of-predication approach, see Rapaport If anything is a non-actual possible object, a unicorn is. Or so it appears. But Kripke vigorously argues against such a view in the version of Kripke 24, — His argument starts with the assumption that the unicorn is intended to be an animal species if anything.

This excludes the possibility that a horse with a horn artificially attached to its forehead is a unicorn. Kripke assumes obviously that there are actually no unicorns and that unicorns are purely mythical creatures. Also assumed is the absence in the relevant myth of any specification of the genetic structure, evolutionary history, or other potentially defining essential features of the unicorn.

Possession of a horn is not a defining essential feature of the unicorn any more than having tawny stripes is a defining feature of the tiger. The myth describes the unicorn only in stereotypical terms: looking like a horse, having a horn protruding from its forehead, etc. Suppose that there are objects with all such stereotypical features of the unicorn. This seems perfectly possible and Kripke accepts such a possibility.

But he rejects its sufficiency for establishing the possibility of unicorns. Suppose that among the objects with the stereotypical unicorn features, some have a genetic makeup, an evolutionary history, or some other potentially defining essential unicorn characteristic which is radically different from the corresponding characteristic had by the others with the same stereotypical unicorn features.

There is no fact of the matter. Given that the unicorn is an animal species, not everything that looks and behaves like a unicorn is guaranteed to be a unicorn. To be a unicorn, an object has to possess the defining essential characteristics of the unicorn. But there are no defining characteristics of the unicorn; the myth does not specify them, and the universe does not instantiate them.

It is unclear that it or something like it is successfully applicable to individuals like Vulcan, but if it is, then we must say that such individuals are impossible objects.

Some theorists liken Vulcan to fictional objects, as we will see in the next section, and some theorists argue that fictional objects are impossible objects Kaplan , version of Kripke —58, Fine —28, Yagisawa — If Vulcan is an impossible object, the problem of uniquely specifying Vulcan, as opposed to Nacluv, becomes less urgent, for it is not evident that we should be able to specify an impossible object uniquely and non-trivially. Let us shift our attention from mythological creatures to fictional objects.

Fictional objects include fictional characters but not all fictional objects are fictional characters. Sherlock Holmes is a fictional object and a fictional character. His liver is a fictional object but not a fictional character. It may be tempting to think that fictional objects are non-actual possible objects, even though it is obvious that not all non-actual possible objects are fictional objects.

There are two main problems with the claim that fictional objects are possible objects. One is the problem of impossible fictional objects. Some fictional objects are ascribed incompatible properties in their home fiction by their original author usually inadvertently. This seems to be sufficient for them to have those properties according to their home fiction, for what the author says in the fiction inadvertently or not seems to hold the highest authority on truth in that fiction.

On the assumption that a fictional object has a given property if it has that property according to its home fiction, those fictional objects are impossible objects, for no possible object has incompatible properties. The other problem is the failure of uniqueness. It may be viewed as the problem of meeting the Quinean demand for clear identity conditions.

Holmes is a particular fictional object. So if we are to identify Holmes with a possible object, we should identify Holmes with a particular possible object. But there are many particular possible objects that are equally suited for the identification with Holmes. Strangely enough, there is also a problem with the claim that fictional objects are non-actual objects. That is, there is some plausible consideration in support of the claim that fictional objects are actual objects.

We make various assertions about fictional objects outside the stories in which they occur and some of them are true: for example, that Sherlock Holmes is admired by many readers of the Holmes stories. The simplest and most systematic explanation appears to be to postulate Holmes as an actual object possessing the properties such true assertions ascribe to him. Fictional objects may then be said to be theoretical objects of literary criticism as much as electrons are theoretical objects of physics.

This type of view enjoys surprisingly wide acceptance. Searle , van Inwagen , , Fine , Salmon , Thomasson The theorists in this camp, except van Inwagen van Inwagen —55 , also think that fictional objects are brought into existence by their authors as actual objects.

Even if this type of view is to be followed, it must still be denied that Holmes is actually a detective, for if we enumerate all individuals who are actually detectives, Holmes will not be among them. By the same token, Holmes is not actually a resident of Baker Street or even a human being. Meinongian theories overcome the problems of impossibility and non-uniqueness in a straightforward way.

A fictional object to which the story ascribes incompatible properties is simply an impossible object, but such an object is harmless because it does not exist. As for the problem of non-uniqueness, Sherlock Holmes is not identified as a complete object. Instead Holmes is said to be the object having just the nuclear properties Holmes has according to the stories. There is no number n such that Holmes has exactly n -many hairs according to the stories. It is an incomplete object.

Zalta offers a similar picture of fictional objects which is subsumed under his general theory of encoding. According to him, a fictional object x which originates in a certain story is the object that encodes exactly the properties F such that according to the story, Fx Zalta — A fictional object to which the story ascribes incompatible properties is an object which encodes those properties, among others. Such an object is harmless because it does not exemplify the incompatible properties.

Sherlock Holmes, for Zalta, is simply an incomplete object which does not encode the property of having exactly n -many hairs, for any n. Though not meant to be a fictional object, Vulcan may be given the same treatment as explicitly fictional objects. In one sense, it is the name of a fictional object which originates in a false astronomical story. In the other sense, it does not refer to anything.

Charles Crittenden offers a view in a Meinongian spirit but with a later-Wittgensteinian twist Crittenden Like Parsons, Crittenden maintains that some objects do not exist and that fictional objects are such objects. Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for the view that fictional objects are kinds Wolterstorff For criticism of this view, see Walton Van Inwagen contains useful compact discussions of some Meinongian and non-Meinongian theories of fictional objects.

Kendall Walton urges that we should take seriously the element of make-believe, or pretense, inherent in the telling of a fictional story by the author and the listening to it by the audience Walton , also Evans —68, Kripke According to this pretense theory, the pretense involved in the language game of fictional discourse shields the whole language game from a separate language game aimed at non-fictional reality, and it is in the latter language game that we seek theories of objects of various kinds as real objects.

If this is right, any search for the real ontological status of fictional objects appears to be misguided. For the view that the pretense theory is compatible with a theory of fictional objects as real objects, see Zalta One important theoretical use of non-actual possible objects is to bolster the most straightforward quantified modal logic Scott , Parsons If it is possible that something is F , then something is such that it is possible that it is F.

The formal logical sentence with this meaning is known as the Barcan Formula , after Ruth C. The antecedent is plausibly true, for there could have been more objects than the actual ones. But if so, the consequent is true as well, assuming the truth of the Barcan Formula. But no actual object is non-identical with every actual object, for every actual object is identical with itself, an actual object.

Assuming the necessity of identity, if an object y is identical with an object z , it is not possible that y is non-identical with z. So, no actual object is such that it is possible that it is non-identical with every actual object. Therefore, any object x such that it is possible that x is non-identical with every actual object must be a non-actual possible object. The converse of the Barcan Formula is also a theorem along with the Barcan Formula in classical logic augmented with a possibility or necessity operator, and is as interesting.

The Converse Barcan Formula , as it is known, says the following:. If something is such that it is possible that it is F , then it is possible that something is F.

The ontology of non-actual possible objects is an integral part of the possibilist view that quantifiers in quantified modal logic range over all possible objects, non-actual as well as actual. This possibilist view validates the Converse Barcan Formula. The antecedent is plausibly true, for any one of us, actual people, could have failed to exist.

But if so, the consequent is true as well, assuming the truth of the Converse Barcan Formula. That is, the existential quantifier in the consequent needs to have a free range independently of the possibility operator in whose scope it occurs, which is hard to fathom on actualist representationism but which the possibilist view allows. The consequent does not even appear to be threatened with contradiction if we assume the possibilist view and let the existential quantifier range over all possible objects, including non-actual ones.

In classical logic, the domain for quantification is assumed to be non-empty and every individual constant is assumed to refer to something in the domain. In free logic , neither of these assumptions is made. Thus free logic appears to be particularly suited to theorizing about non-existent objects; see Lambert , Jacquette For a criticism of the free-logical approach to fictional discourse, see Woods 68— Williamson contains a detailed and useful discussion of the Barcan Formula and the Converse Barcan Formula.

What They Are 2. Possible Worlds 2. Without Possible Worlds 3. Existence 3. Unicorns 5. Fictional Objects 6. What They Are Possible objects— possibilia sing. If we combine talk of actuality and talk of existence, we obtain five alternative conservative views with varying degrees of conservatism: 1 Any object is an actual existing object; 2 Any object is an actual object, that is, it is either an actual existing object or an actual non-existing object; 3 Any object is an existing object, that is, it is either an actual existing object or a non-actual existing object; 4 Any object that is actual is an existing object; 5 Any object that exists is an actual object.

P1 No two objects have exactly the same nuclear properties; P2 For any set of nuclear properties, some object has all the nuclear properties in the set and no other nuclear properties. Z1 Objects which could sometimes have a spatial location do not, and cannot, encode properties; Z2 For any condition on properties, some object that could never have a spatial location encodes exactly those properties which satisfy the condition. Bibliography Adams, R. Reprinted in Loux — Armstrong, D.

Barcan, R. Bennett, K. Bigelow, J. Braun, D. Brock, S. Cameron, R. Carnap, R. Chandler, H. Chalmers, D. Chisholm, R. Cresswell, M. Crittenden, C. Cullison, A. Currie, G. Davidson, D. Divers, J. Donnellan, K. Evans, G. Everett, A. Fara, D. Findlay, J. Fine, K. Sinnott-Armstrong ed. Fitch, G. Forrest, P. Grossmann, R. Hayaki, R. Hazen, A. Hintikka, J. Howell, R. Jacquette, D. Jeffrey, R. Jubien, M. Kaplan, D. Kripke, S. Reprinted in Linsky 63— Published as a book with the same title in with a substantial preface and seven addenda, from Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lambert, K. Lewis, D. Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis 26— Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis 10— Reprinted in Lewis — Linsky, B. Linsky, L. Loux, M. Lycan, W. Reprinted with additional material as chapters 1, 3, and 4 in Lycan Reprinted in part with additional material in Lycan 95— Mally, E.

Marcus, R. Reprinted in Marcus 3—35, with appendices. Reprinted in Marcus — McDaniel, K. Lewis , F. Jackson and G. Priest eds. McMichael, A. Meinong, A. Menzel, C. Murray, A. Nelson, M. Oliver, A. If the query that defines the object view involves joins, however, you must provide a key across all tables involved in the joins, so that the key still uniquely identifies rows of the object view. This makes it easy for trigger programs to identify the corresponding row in the base table uniquely.

Data in the rows of an object view may come from more than one table, but the object still traverses the network in one operation. You can manipulate it like any other native structure. You can refer to object views in SQL statements the same way you refer to an object table. You can access object view data on the client side using the same OCI calls you use for objects from object tables.

When you update or flush to the server an object in an object view, Oracle updates the object view. Oracle updates the base tables of the object view if there is no ambiguity. If a view query contains pseudocolumns or expressions, the corresponding view columns are not updatable. Object views often involve joins. Oracle invokes the appropriate trigger instead of the SQL statement, and the actions specified in the trigger body take place.

All Rights Reserved. This can be especially useful if an otherwise large part includes many important dimension in a small area. Using the detail view improves the readability of these measurements. An orthographic view to represent planes that are not horizontal or vertical. It helps to show inclined surfaces without any distortion. As said before, new CNC machines are actually able to read the dimensions straight from the lines. But a traditional manufacturing drawing shows all the necessary dimensions for producing the parts.

The keyword here is necessary. Avoid using the auto-dimensioning feature that a lot of CAD programs offer because they tend to show everything they can find. For a beginner, it may seem like adding it all ensures that no mistakes can be made. Actually, it can result in a confusing web of measurements that is left for the manufacturing engineer to untangle.

Also, adding all dimensions you can find makes it hard to pinpoint which ones are the most important. The image above shows a shaft with all the measurements. Therefore, you have to determine the most important ones.

In our case, we chose the end steps to be more important than the length of the central part. Thus, we should delete the mm dimension. For example, when looking to produce a shaft for a bearing system, limits and fits are of high importance. The right dimensions can guarantee a longer lifetime with less maintenance. While you can fetch all the dimensions automatically by clicking the measure button, adding engineering tolerances needs manual action.

Therefore, adding dimensions with lower and upper limits or fit classes is still important. Note that you do not have to provide the whole dimensioning — only include the tolerances of a single hole on your engineering drawings if necessary.

The little boxes in the bottom right corner show additional information. There can be much more info on there but the title blocks vary widely between different companies. Information blocks also include a bill of materials, or BOM for short. These blocks list all the components used in the assembly, along with additional information like quantities, part names, etc.

To avoid this, remember the purpose of these engineering drawings during the creation process — they must make the assembling easy. Exploded views , section views, numbered parts, general dimensions, cutouts, detail views or close-ups are all tools you can use to achieve this goal. It should be clear where each part goes and how it is attached — whether it needs welding, bolted connections, riveting or something else. The bill of materials is there to help you, so make sure the information available there is correct regarding part numbers, names and quantities.

Keeping everything above in mind will help you create assembly drawings that make life easier on the shop floor. A piece of great advice I once received goes like this — keep the thinking in the drawing-room. Avoiding multiple interpretation possibilities at later steps will significantly decrease the number of errors.

We at Fractory are trying to save this time by automating the reading of 3D models for production. The purpose is to keep the focus on engineering better products. The engineering community is seeing this movement as a new trend. But as we all know, taking the whole industry up to a new standard takes a lot of time. Thus, if you still outsource your production to manufacturing companies who need drawings, you must know the basics at the very least.

Leaving room for interpretation creates a situation where your idea may not be executed as planned. And there is nobody else to blame but the author.

So consider this stage of the product development process as an integral part that requires thinking along. Keep the thinking in the drawing-room. Get Instant Quote. Get instant quote. Knowledge base. Receive engineering articles to your inbox monthly.

This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged. Subscribe to newsletter. Table of Contents hide. I The Purpose of Engineering Drawings.